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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
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RITE WAY CONCRETE FORMING, INC., a Utah corporation, PETER LOWE, JR., J. RANDALL 
OUTSEN, TRACY M. JONES, RICHARD H. LOWE, and DON BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
and 
PETER LOWE, JR., and RICHARD H. LOWE, 
Cross-Complainants, Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DON BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Cross-Defendants, 
and 
DON BAILEY, DRAPER BANK, a Utah corporation, and JACOBSEN-ROBBINS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
In the interest of brevity, as mandated by the rules of 
this Court, Respondents Peter Lowe, Jr., and Richard H. Lowe 
accept the treatment in Petitionees brief as it related to the 
following: 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, REGULATIONS, ETC. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A review of the foregoing, together with a review of 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals [Valley Bank and Trust 
Company v. Riteway Concrete Forming Inc., 64 Utah Advance Reports 
66 (CA Utah 1987)] will provide the Court with an adequate 
background to rule on the petition for issuance of a writ of 
certiorari, 
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
Petitioner invites review based on an unsupported 
allegation that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in 
conflict with prior decisions of this Court. No such conflict 
exists, and, accordingly, Petitioner never really develops this 
argument. There is an effort to find an inconsistency with a 
Colorado case relied upon by the Court, but such effort fails in 
the face of the facts of the case and the equitable maxim that 
2 
the law does not require a useless act. 
Petitioner also complains that the Court of Appeals 
buttressed its decision by reference to a provision of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which Petitioner claims to be 
inapplicable. There are two compelling reasons to decline 
granting certiorari to treat this issue. First, the Court of 
Appeals1 principal reliance is premised on a well-established 
general rule of case law rather than the U.C.C. While the U.C.C. 
is cited in support, it is not necessary to the decision. 
Second, this Court, in Continental Bank, etc. v. Utah Sec. 
Mortq. , 701 P.2d 1095 (1985), has applied the precise same 
sections of the U.C.C. in a similar case involving personal 
guaranties. 
POINT I: PAYMENT ON A CONTRACT OF PERSONAL GUARANTY NEED NOT BE 
MADE BEFORE 
SUBROGATION 
THE 
RIGHTS 
GUARANTOR 
HAVE BEEN 
CAN RAISE 
WRONGFULLY 
A DEFENSE 
IMPAIRED BY 
THAT 
THE 
BENEFICIARY OF THE GUARANTY, 
In the case at bar, the Bank affirmatively released the 
collateral securing the loan covered by the personal guaranties 
of the Lowes. Such release came after the said personal guarant-
ors had located the collateral for the benefit of the Bank. The 
release was accomplished without the knowledge or awareness of 
the personal guarantors and effectively emasculated their 
subrogation rights. 
Relying upon solid authority from the courts of 
Colorado and Arizona, and on the general rule as set forth by 
3 
text writers1, the Court of Appeals adopted the equitable concept 
that wrongful inpairment of subrogation rights of a personal 
guarantor will discharge such guarantor from his obligation to 
the extent of the impairment. [Valley Bank v. Rite Way, supra at 
64.] 
Petitioner argues to this Court that the Court of 
Appeals erred in recognizing a right of subrogation without first 
requiring payment on the personal guaranties. In essence, 
Petitioner argues that the personal guarantors should have been 
required to make full payment to the bank on the personal 
guaranties and then turn around and sue the bank for a refund. 
Petitioner offers no reason for following this circui-
tous route to justice. As stated by the Supreme Court of our 
sister state, "It is an ancient and well-established maxim that 
equity does not require the doing of a vain and useless thing as 
a prerequisite to obtaining equitable relief." [Saccomano v. 
Palermo, 411 P.2d 22, 25 (Colo. 1966).] 
While Respondent found no cases arising in the precise 
factual context that exists in the case at bar, there are 
numerous cases where parties have sought to insist on meaningless 
tenders of payment. Confronted with such an argument, the 
Supreme Court of Kansas stated, "[T]ender by Riley would be a 
mere formality. Equity does not insist on purposeless conduct 
1
 The Court cited: Behlen Mfg. Co. v. First National 
Bank, 28 Colo. Ct. App. 300, 472 P.2d 703 (1970); D.W. Jaquays 
and Co. v. First Security Bank, 101 Ariz. 301, 419 P.2d 85 
(1966); Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 606 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1980), 38 
Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 84 (1968). 
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and disregards mere formality." rcarpenter v. Rileyf 675 P. 2d 
900, 904 (1984); further, see Parker v. McCaulev, 393 P.2d 527 
(Okla. 1964); 30 C.J.S. Equity § 89; 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 119; 
27 Pac. Dig. Equity § 54.] 
Petitionerfs effort to create a conflict with the 
Colorado case of Behlen Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank, supraf 
is ill-advised. It is correct that the personal guarantor 
(Behlen) in that case had made payment on the personal guaranty 
before filing suit against the bank, but such was not considered 
a prerequisite. It rather resulted from the natural flow of 
events. Behlen paid the bank on its personal guaranty and took 
possession of the collateral. Subsequently, the trustee of the 
principal debtor's estate successfully challenged Behlen's 
interest in the collateral. The collateral was ultimately lost 
because the bank had failed to properly protect the same while it 
was under its charge. Behlen then successfully sued the bank to 
recover the payment it had made on the personal guaranty. 
There is a stark contrast between the Behlen case and 
the case at bar. In Behlen, the personal guarantor made payment 
and took possession of the collateral without awareness that its 
subrogation interest would subsequently be defeated. In the case 
at bar, the subrogation rights of the personal guarantors were 
prematurely defeated by the affirmative release of collateral by 
the bank. 
The general rule of law as stated by the authors of 
American Jurisprudence implies that interference with subrogation 
5 
rights gives rise to a defense in an action brought on the 
personal guaranty rather than forming the basis for an affirma-
tive claim to obtain a refund. The text states: 
[T]he guarantor, if the security had not been 
lost, would have been subrogated to the 
creditor's right to resort thereto; and 
hence, having been deprived of this right by 
the creditor's act, the guarantor is not 
liable on the contract of guaranty. [38 Am. 
Jur. 2d Guaranty § 84, at 1091.] [Emphasis 
added.] 
It should further be noted that in the other cases 
relied on by the Court of Appeals—D.W. Jaquays and Co. v. First 
Security Bank, supra, and Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, supra—the 
personal guarantors had not made payment on their personal 
guaranties, but were being sued for such payment by the benefici-
aries of the guaranties. In each case, the personal guarantors 
successfully raised defenses based on the interference with their 
subrogation rights. Supportive of the same general concept in 
the context of commercially unreasonable sales after repossession 
of collateral, see Pioneer Dodge Inc. v. Glaubensklee, 649 P. 2d 
28 (Utah 1982) and FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro Printers, 590 P.2d 
803 (Utah 1979). 
POINT II: PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SUPPORT 
THE RESULT REACHED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
The Court of Appeals applied the general rule of case 
law that a personal guarantor's right of subrogation is a 
"creature of equity," and that it cannot be abrogated with 
impunity unless there has been an express waiver or consent by 
the personal guarantor. The court stated that this general rule 
6 
has been codified in the Utah Uniform Commercial Code § 70A-3-
606(1) (1980). 
This Court employed essentially the same analysis in 
Continental Bank etc, v. Utah Security Mortgage, supra, conclud-
ing that the personal guarantors in that action could not rely 
upon interference with their subrogation rights because the 
guaranty signed by them contained an "explicit consent to impair-
ment." [Id., at 1097.]2 
Neither the Court of Appeals, nor this Court in 
Continental Bank focused precisely on the "label" which should be 
applied to a guaranty agreement under the U.C.C. Accordingly, 
Petitioner encourages this Court to engage in an analysis of 
"guaranty agreements" vis-a-vis "negotiable instruments," with 
the end design of determining when reference should be had to the 
U.C.C. 
Whether such an inquiry ought ever to be undertaken is 
a matter which may be debated, but it seems obvious that it ought 
not be taken in the context of the current case, where it would 
have no impact on the ultimate outcome. 
The fundamental underlying concepts codified in the 
subject provisions of the U.C.C. are identical to those estab-
lished by the solid case law principally relied upon by the Court 
of Appeals. At the very least, the U.C.C. supports and is fully 
2
 The agreement of guaranty executed by each of the 
personal guarantors in Continental provided, "[T]he liability of 
the guarantor[s] shall not be affected, released, or exonerated 
by release or surrender of any security held for the payment of 
any of the debts hereinbefore mentioned. . . . " 
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consistent with the decision reached. 
If Petitioner wants to challenge the manner in which 
this Court in Continental Bank or the Court of Appeals herein has 
employed or made reference to the U.C.C., it should select a case 
where the analysis would be thorough and the application (or lack 
thereof) consequential. In this case it would be merely an 
exercise in academics. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Petitioner seeks review of what are essentially "non-
issues." Its first point is not supported by any case law or by 
any compelling reason. It would ask this Court to decree the 
performance of a useless act as a foundation for an equitable 
defense well established in the law. Its second point encourages 
the Court to engage in an academic analysis which would not 
change the outcome of the litigation. 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of December, 1987. 
KAY L. MdJjFf,. F d R ^ _ / T" t l5 ~~~^-^ 
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBESRI^ mS— —^ 
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